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I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions' construing the scope of the federal
securities acts, the Supreme Court apparently has undertaken to
alleviate some of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the
most fundamental question in securities law: the definition of
"security" itself. Much of the existing confusion can be traced to
earlier decisions of the Court that first implied,2 and later held, 3
that the regulatory or offering context in which a particular trans-
action occurs could function to exclude the transaction from cover-
age of the securities laws' antifraud provisions. This result could
follow even though the transaction in question otherwise might
satisfy the traditional Howey4 or "economic reality" test for deter-
mining the presence of a "security."
Because the Court has offered few clear guidelines for exclud-
ing a transaction in this manner, however, these earlier decisions,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel5 and Marine
Bank v. Weaver, have obscured, rather than clarified, the thresh-
old question that must be addressed whenever the federal securi-
ties laws are invoked. In particular, the Court's analysis in Weaver
has resulted in a great deal of uncertainty about the circumstances
under which instruments clearly fitting within the statutory defini-
tion should be denied coverage and when other, more unusual,
transactions similarly ought to be excluded.
1. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (same).
2. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
3. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
4. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See infra notes 10-16 and accompany-
ing text.
5. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
6. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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At first glance, the Court's more recent decisions rejecting the
"sale of business" doctrine, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth7 and
Gould v. Ruefenacht,3 indicate the Court's desire to render more
predictable the applicability of the federal securities laws. In Lan-
dreth the Court observed, "[i]t is fair to say that our cases have
not been entirely clear on the proper method of analysis for deter-
mining when an instrument is a 'security.' " ' Consistent with this
observation, the Court refrained from raising "difficult questions of
line-drawing," 10 in order to avoid the even "more daunting . . .
prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discov-
ery and litigation."11 Thus, although the thrust of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine is that a transfer of control through the sale of tradi-
tional stock is precisely the sort of context in which the antifraud
provisions' protection is unnecessary, the Court looked instead to
the statutory definition's "plain meaning" in holding that such a
transaction necessarily involves a "security.' 2
Perhaps in recognition that "context" analysis had assumed a
key role in its prior decisions construing the definition of "secur-
ity," however, the Court in Landreth also observed that "the con-
text of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corpo-
ration-is typical of the kind of context to which the Acts
normally apply."" Nevertheless, while explicitly referring to the
role of "context" in determining the presence of a "security,' 14
Landreth fails to offer much insight into the nagging questions
raised by Weaver. The Court's sale of business decisions merely
resolve one isolated issue that gained prominence in the wake of
Weaver and its persistent ambiguities. In effect, despite its allu-
sion to the need for clarity in this area, the Court forfeited an op-
portunity to elaborate the precise role of "context" analysis. Thus,
in search of a working definition of "security," one must return to
grapple with Weaver-a formidable task because, although
Weaver may well be the Court's most significant opinion in the
definition of "security" area, it has received relatively little critical
7. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
8. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
9. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 688.
10. Id. at 696.
11. Id. at 696-97.
12. Id. at 687.
13. Id.
14. Id.; cf. Gould, 471 U.S. at 704.
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attention,15 in contrast to the extensive commentary devoted to the
sale of business doctrine.16 Moreover, not only is Weaver riddled
with ambiguity, the decision is also simplistic, and its understand-
ing of securities law is weak.
Weaver, when viewed in isolation, is indeed an unfortunate
decision containing ill-conceived analysis and having potentially
massive ramifications, as the following discussion will elaborate in
detail. The main point of this Article, however, is that when con-
sidered with a number of other recent Supreme Court decisions
involving federal securities law, Weaver serves as a compelling
focus for an even more serious problem: The Supreme Court's ap-
parent inability to comprehend thoroughly and to address analyti-
cally, consistently with the language, legislative history, and under-
lying policies of the securities acts, the important issues of federal
securities regulation.
Part II of this Article offers an overview of Supreme Court
decisions construing the definition of "security" and concludes
with an examination of the Court's analysis in Weaver. Part III
explores the Court's use of the "context" clause preceding the stat-
utory definition as a vehicle for expanding or contracting the se-
curities acts' scope and analysis and the potential ramifications of
that approach and focuses particular attention on the problems
that arise from the Court's treatment of certificates of deposit.
Part IV addresses the present state of "investment contract" anal-
ysis and assesses the continued validity of the Howey test for de-
termining the presence of a security. Part V seeks to expose the
Court's misunderstanding of congressional intent in its application
of the securities laws. Finally, Part VI offers further evidence of
the Court's deficiencies in this area by examining recent decisions
involving two additional issues of increasing concern: tender offers
and insider trading.
15. A few commentators, at least to a degree, have addressed Weaver. See, e.g., Ar-
nold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" and Other Riddles: The Definition of a Security Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (1984-85); Bunch, Marine Bank v.
Weaver: What is a Security?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (1983); Carney, Defining a Security:
The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analy-
sis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984); Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition
of a Security, 19 U.C, DAvis L. REV. 403 (1986); Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Defini-
tion of Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1982); Note, The Definition of Security: Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1053 (1983); see also M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 81-86
(1986).
16. See infra note 50.
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II. THE MEANING OF "SECURITY"
A. The Court's Analytical Framework
The definition of "security" in the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 193417 ("the Acts") covers a broad
range of transactions. Although the term includes familiar instru-
ments such as stock, notes, bonds, and "in general, any instrument
commonly known as a 'security,' 18 the statutory definition also
encompasses a wide variety of irregular devices. In part because of
the remedial purposes 9 underlying the federal securities laws, the
17. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). Section 3(a)(10), for example, provides:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires -
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or
other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in gen-
eral, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). The definition of "security" in the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), Id. §
77(b)(1), is virtually identical and has been treated as such in the Court's decisions constru-
ing the scope of that term. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1
(1985).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
19. The Senate Report on the Securities Act of 1933 states:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business. The
basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be
offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudu-
lent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true
information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest
presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the
public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor
in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry
and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 1 SECURrIES LAW COMM., FEDERAL
BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL SEcuRIEs LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, Item 6, at 89 (1983)
[hereinafter FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS].
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term "investment contract"2 has emerged as a catch-all for trans-
actions that do not fit neatly into the conventional categories. 21
The Supreme Court has construed the definition of "security"
on several occasions.2 In the first such case, SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp.,3 the Court recognized that although the statutory
definition makes specific reference to a number of "standardized"
investment devices, "the reach of the Act does not stop with the
obvious and commonplace. '24 Therefore, as the Court suggested,
other "[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices" may fall within
one of the definition's more descriptive categories, such as "invest-
ment contract," if the facts so warrant.25
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 26 the Court subsequently explained
that the term "investment contract" had been employed in previ-
ously enacted state "blue sky" laws and had come to signify "a
contract or scheme for 'the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment.' ",27 The Howey Court emphasized that "investment
contract" embodies a "flexible rather than a static principle"2 8 and
that the term had been broadly construed as a means of protecting
the investing public. 9 "Form was disregarded for substance and
emphasis was placed upon economic reality."30 Reasoning that
Congress was aware of prior judicial interpretation of "investment
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); see also supra note 17.
21. See generally 1 L. Loss, SEcuRITms REGULATION 483-511 (2d ed. 1961).
22. See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); Landreth Timer Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681 (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943).
23. 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (holding that the sale of assignments of oil leasehold subdivi-
sions constituted a sale of securities).
24. Id. at 351.
25. Id. The court looked to such factors as "what character the instrument is given in
commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect." Id. at 352-53.
26. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (holding that the sale of units in a citrus grove development
together with service contracts for cultivating and marketing the produce constituted a sale
of securities).
27. Id. at 298 (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W.
937, 938 (1920)).
28. 328 U.S. at 299.
29. Id. at 298.
30. Id.
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contract" when it employed the term in defining "security" 1 and
noting that a broad construction was consistent with the federal
securities laws' remedial intent,3 the Howey Court devised a stan-
dard to comport with this background.
Under what has become known as the "Howey test," an
investment contract is a transaction or scheme that involves "an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others."3 " In Tcherepnin v. Knight 4 the
Court reiterated that "remedial legislation should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes"3 5 and that "[e]ven a casual
reading of [section] 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act reveals that Congress
did not intend to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security
in defining that term." ' Therefore, in its early post-Howey deci-
sions construing the Acts, the Court adopted a flexible, expansive
interpretation of the three-part Howey test.38 The lower courts,
expanding on the Howey test, followed suit. 9 By the mid-1970s,
however, the Court retreated from this remedial approach.
The decision that signaled the Court's retreat was United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. In Forman the Court held
that shares of stock in a cooperative housing project purchased by
individuals who were residents of the apartment complex were not
31. Id.
32. Id. at 299 (defining the term "investment contract" to encompass "a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits").
33. Id. at 301.
34. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
35. Id. at 336 (also stating that "form should be disregarded for substance and the
emphasis should be on economic reality").
36. Id. at 338 (footnote omitted).
37. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (holding that
variable annuity contracts are securities); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (hold-
ing that withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan association are securities); SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (holding that "flexible fund" annuity con-
tracts are securities).
38. In brief, the Howey test requires (1) an investment, (2) in a common enterprise,
(3) with the expectation of profits to be derived solely or essentially from the efforts of
others. See 328 U.S. at 301.
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that a franchise-like "pyramid" promotion scheme involved securities even though the in-
vestors exerted some effort, provided that the promoters' efforts were the undeniably signifi-
cant ones); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (looking to
"whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
40. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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securities. The Court assessed the economic realities of the trans-
action: the shares purchased did not confer the attendant rights
that ordinarily accompany stock, were not transferable to a non-
tenant, could not be pledged or encumbered, carried no voting
rights, and had to be offered back to the cooperative housing cor-
poration at the initial selling price. In determining whether the
shares of stock constituted securities, the Court rejected a literal
approach and refused to require that the transaction, evidenced by
the sale of "stock," be considered a security transaction merely be-
cause the statutory definition of a security contains the words "any
... stock." '41 Instead, the Court stressed that economic reality, not
form, should control: "Because securities transactions are economic
in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to
turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on
the name appended thereto."' 2
After finding that the shares of stock in Forman lacked the
attributes of ordinary stock, the Court also declined to view the
instruments as investment contracts. The Court reasoned that the
securities laws are inapplicable when the purchaser is "motivated
by a desire to use or consume the item purchased," rather than by
the anticipation of receiving a return on his investment.'
Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel44 the Supreme Court applied the "economic reality" con-
cept to constrict, rather than broaden, the definition of "invest-
ment contract." Specifically, the Court held that a noncontribu-
tory, compulsory pension plan is not an investment contract and,
hence, not a security. In a noncontributory, compulsory pension
plan, the employer contributes the necessary payments, not the
41. Id. at 848 (construing Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982)).
42. Forman, 421 U.S. at 849. The Court, however, did not reject the name given to an
instrument as irrelevant:
There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name such as "stocks" or
"bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws ap-
ply. This would clearly be the case when the underlying transaction embodies some of
the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
Id. at 850-51. Applying this rationale, the Court in Gould v. Reufenacht, 471 U.S. 701
(1985), and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), held that shares of
"stock" having the characteristics normally identified with such instruments constitute se-
curities. For further discussion, see infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
43. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. See id. at 852 (defining "profits" to mean "either
capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment.., or a partic-
ipation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds"). See generally Deacon &
Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision, 11 PAC. L.J. 213 (1980).
44. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
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employee who ultimately benefits from the plan. The Court
applied the three-pronged Howey test for an investment contract.
Concentrating on the economic reality of the plan, the Court
observed that "an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain
a livelihood, not making an investment" and, therefore, concluded
that the Howey test's "investment of money" element was not sat-
isfied.'5 Moreover, the employer's contributions to the fund were
not the equivalent of an "investment" by the employee because no
fixed relationship existed between the employer's contributions
and the employee's potential benefits. The Court also found that
the pension fund's maintenance did not depend on profits yielded
by the efforts of others. To the contrary, the vast majority of the
income generated derived from the employer's contributions and
thus was independent from the efforts of the fund's managers. In
addition, actual receipt of benefits from the fund depended on
whether employees met certain individual eligibility requirements,
not on the financial success of the fund itself. 6
The Court further supported its holding in Daniel by conclud-
ing that the enactment of ERISA, which expressly regulates pen-
sion plans,'7 eliminated the need for coverage under the securities
laws:
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms
of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the
Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress
believed that it was fulfilling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the extension of the
Securities Act ... not supported by the language and history of those Acts,
but in light of ERISA it serves no general purpose .... Whatever benefits
employees might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now pro-
vided in more definite form through ERISA. 8
Thus, in both Forman and Daniel the Supreme Court
employed the language, if not quite the spirit, of the Howey "eco-
nomic reality" test to exclude transactions that otherwise might
fall within the definition of "investment contract."' 9 More recently,
45. Id. at 560-61.
46. Id. at 561-62.
47. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
48. 439 U.S. at 569-70 (citations omitted). See generally Stansbury & Bedol, Interests
in Employee Benefit Plans as Securities: Daniel and Beyond, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 226 (1980);
Comment, The Impact of the Daniel Litigation: Growing Interest in Pension Vesting and
Investment Control, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1228.
49. We do not suggest that the Court's conclusions in Forman and Daniel were unwar-
ranted on the basis of the facts. Clearly, however, the Court approached those cases with a
1987] 497
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however, in rejecting the sale of business doctrine, 50 the Court indi-
cated that scrutiny of a transaction's economic substance is neces-
sary only when the instruments involved are "unusual... not eas-
ily characterized as 'securities.' "51 Hence, the Court distinguished
Forman in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth52 and Gould v.
Ruefenacht53 by reasoning that the stock involved in the latter
cases bore all the characteristics traditionally associated with com-
mon stock, which the Court described as follows: "(i) the right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii)
negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypotheticated; (iv)
the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. '54 Look-
ing to the "plain meaning" of the statutory definition of a "secur-
ity," the Court held that traditional stock necessarily falls within
the Acts' coverage. 5 In light of its failure to address the important
questions raised by Weaver, however, the Court's rejection of the
sale of business doctrine should not be regarded as the commence-
ment of a more expansionist era.
B. Marine Bank v. Weaver
The dispute in Weaver had its origins in the troubled financial
condition of the Columbus Packing Company, an unincorporated,
family-owned business that operated a wholesale slaughterhouse
and retail meat market. Although Columbus was not a party to the
suit, the company's financial plight was central to the fraudulent
misconduct claims that later arose. Between 1976 and 1978,
much narrower view of the term "security" than it had displayed in previous decisions.
50. The "sale of business" doctrine was the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When Is Stock
Not a Security?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 393 (1983); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Se-
curity: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction,
57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225 (1982); Note, Function Over Form: The Sale of Business Doctrine and
the Definition of "Security", 63 B.U.L. REV. 1129 (1983).
51. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 690 (1985).
52. Id. at 689-92.
53. 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985).
54. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 (footnote omitted). See Gould, 471 U.S. at 704-06.
55. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687; see Gould, 471 U.S. at 704. Hence, in both cases the
Court rejected the argument that the instrument at issue was not a security simply because
the Howey test had not been satisfied. The Landreth Court noted that in contrast to previ-
ous decisions in which it had employed the Howey test, the instrument involved in the case
at bar was "traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition." 471 U.S. at 690.
Hence, the Court found "no need here, as there was in [our] prior cases, to look beyond the
characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply." Id.
[Vol. 40:489
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Columbus obtained three secured loans from Marine Bank.5 6 By
early 1978, it became apparent to officers of Marine Bank that Co-
lumbus did not have adequate cash flow to meet its debts. In addi-
tion to the outstanding loans, for which there was no set repay-
ment schedule, Columbus was substantially overdrawn on its
checking account with the bank and had failed to meet both past
due federal taxes and past due obligations to trade creditors.57 In
view of Columbus' precarious financial condition, Marine Bank's
local manager designated the loans "concerned" and informed the
owners, Raymond and Barbara Piccirillo, that the bank would take
possession of its collateral unless they repaid the bank by (1) sell-
ing the business, (2) closing the business and selling its assets, or
(3) securing additional capital."
Subsequently, Marine Bank and Columbus executed a new
agreement. The bank agreed to lend Columbus an additional
$65,000 in exchange for a secured demand note signed by the Pic-
cirillos and an agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs. Weaver guaran-
teeing payment of the debt to a maximum of $50,000. 59 The latter
guaranty was secured by the pledge of a $50,000 certificate of
deposit, which Marine Bank previously had issued to the Weav-
ers. 0 In consideration for their guaranty, the Piccirillos agreed to
pay the Weavers fifty percent of the packing company's adjusted
net profits and one hundred dollars per month for as long as the
Weavers remained co-obligors on the new loan. The agreement
between the Weavers and the Piccirillos also entitled the Weavers
to use the Columbus barn and pasture, at the Piccirillos' discre-
tion, and further provided that the Piccirillos would not borrow
additional funds without first consulting with the Weavers and
obtaining their approval.6 1
Of the additional $65,000 lent by Marine Bank, the bank
56. See Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982). The loans were secured by perfected security interests in Columbus' assets, including
"equipment, inventory and accounts receivable, liens on several motor vehicles, and second
mortgages on two pieces of real estate."
57. Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159. As of March 1978, $33,000 in loans from Marine Bank
remained unpaid. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 553. In addition, Columbus had overdrawn its check-
ing account by approximately $9,800 and owed approximately $18,400 in back taxes and to
other creditors. See Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159.
58. Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159.
59. Id. The note was secured identically to the previous loans. See supra note 56.
60. Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159. The certificate of deposit had a six-year maturity, paid
7.5%( interest, and was insurable by the FDIC to a maximum of $40,000. Weaver, 455 U.S.
at 552-53 & n.1.
61. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 553. See supra note 57.
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retained $42,800 to repay the previous loans and to cover the over-
drafts on Columbus' checking account. Another $18,400 was imme-
diately disbursed to satisfy the company's other financial obliga-
tions. Only $3,800 of the $65,000 loan remained for working
capital. Moreover, the bank no longer permitted Columbus to over-
draw its account. When Columbus filed for bankruptcy four
months later, Marine Bank indicated that because the security for
the new loan was inadequate, it would resort to the Weavers' cer-
tificate of deposit for the deficiency.62
The Weavers filed suit in federal court, asserting violations of
the federal securities laws and also pleading pendent state law
claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Securities Act and for
common-law fraud. Specifically, the Weavers alleged that officers
of Marine Bank violated section 10(b), 4 the general antifraud pro-
vision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act"), by soliciting their investment in Columbus for the asserted
purpose of providing working capital, while the bank officers had
full knowledge of and failed to disclose the company's desperate
financial condition.6 5 Hence, the Weavers contended that although
they had no knowledge of or interest in investing in a slaughter-
house business66 and initially declined to make the investment,
62. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 553-54; Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159.
63. See Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159.
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986), adopted by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission pursuant to its rulemaking authority under § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
65. Weaver, 637 F.2d at 160.
66. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Weaver, aged 79 and 71, were engaged in the business of auction-
ing livestock. Neither possessed formal education beyond the eighth grade, and they both
had spent their entire lives as cattle farmers. Id. at 159.
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Marine Bank persuaded them to pledge their certificate of deposit
and enter into the agreement with the Piccirillos. According to the
Weavers, Marine Bank represented that substantially all the loan's
proceeds would be available for working capital and, moreover,
that the Weavers' investment would be adequately protected by
existing collateral. 7
The pivotal question in the suit was whether the transaction
involved a "security," as defined by section 3(a)(10) of the Ex-
change Act."8 In a brief opinion authored by former Chief Justice
Burger, the Court unanimously held that neither the agreement
between the Weavers and the Piccirillos nor the certificate of de-
posit issued by Marine Bank was a "security" for purposes of the
1934 Act.6" At the outset of its analysis the Court paraphrased the
67. Id. at 160. Marine Bank responded that (1) it had disclosed to the Weavers all
relevant information regarding Columbus' finances of which it had knowledge; (2) at the
time, it believed the loans were fully collateralized; and (3) it had no knowledge of the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos. Id. at 159-60.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). See supra note 17. Without deciding whether the bank's
conduct might otherwise constitute a violation of § 10(b), the district court concluded, as a
matter of law, that if any wrong occurred it did not take place "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." Weaver, 637 F.2d at 160 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). The
district court, therefore, entered summary judgment for Marine Bank on the federal claim
and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. 637 F.2d at 159.
The Third Circuit reversed, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), on
the grounds that a trier of fact could have found that the bank officers had engaged in
"manipulative and deceptive conduct" in soliciting the Weavers' participation; that such
conduct, if it took place, was in connection with the agreement between the Weavers and
the Piccirillos; and that the Weaver-Piccirillo agreement itself was a "security" within the
meaning of § 3(a)(10). 637 F.2d at 160-64. More specifically, the court of appeals held that
the interest "sold" by the Piccirillos in exchange for the Weavers' guaranty could be consid-
ered either a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement" or an
"investment contract," or both. Id. at 161.
The court of appeals' holding with respect to the Weaver-Piccirillo transaction was a
sufficient basis for finding that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment.
Before remanding for retrial, however, the Third Circuit also addressed the issue of whether
the certificate of deposit issued by Marine Bank was a security. The court initially noted
that the Securities Acts do not exempt bank securities from their antifraud provisions and
that the Weavers' six-year certificate did not fall within the § 3(a)(10) exception for short-
term instruments. Id. at 164. The thrust of the court's analysis thereafter focused on the
premise that the certificate of deposit, which obligated Marine Bank to pay a sum certain at
a fixed rate of return, was the "functional equivalent" of a long-term bond or note. In view
of the Exchange Act's inclusion of such instruments within its definition of a "security," the
court thought it ill-advised to dismiss the question without further factual development. Id.
69. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560. As discussed in note 68 supra, the Third Circuit's line of
reasoning stands in marked contrast to the Supreme Court's restrictive approach in Weaver.
Not only did the Court arguably disregard the Act's legislative history and make unwar-
ranted presumptions about congressional intent, see infra notes 190-206 and accompanying
text, in holding that a certificate of deposit is not a security; the Court also failed to recog-
nize the dual nature of the problem when it concluded that federal banking regulations
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prefatory language to section 3(a) (10), 70 stating that the terms in-
cluded in the Act's definitional section are not to be considered
securities if "the context otherwise requires. 7 1 The Court then
concluded that "Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not
intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud. '7 2
In addressing the certificate of deposit issue, the Court ele-
vated the presence of other comprehensive regulation, a factor of
inferential importance in Daniel,73 to paramount significance in
Weaver.7 4 The Court commenced its analysis by distinguishing the
withdrawable capital shares in Tcherepnin v. Knight 5 on the
ground that the Tcherepnin purchasers received dividends based
on the savings and loan associations' profits, rather than at a fixed
rate of interest, and also received voting rights.76 The Court
observed that the withdrawable capital shares "were much more
like ordinary shares of stock and 'the ordinary concept of a secur-
ity,' . . . than a certificate of deposit. '7 7 Then, looking to the con-
text of the transaction, the Court turned to the differences it per-
ceived between a certificate of deposit and other long-term debt
obligations. The Court focused not on the particular attributes of
these instruments, but rather on the existence of comprehensive
federal regulation governing the banking industry. Unlike the
holder of a long-term debt obligation, who assumes the risk of the
borrower's insolvency, the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is
almost assured of repayment.78 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that "[it is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of
deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are
abundantly protected under the federal banking laws."71 9
adequately protect the depositor and therefore obviate any need for investor protection
under the securities laws.
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); supra note 17.
71. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 556.
72. Id.
73. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text.
74. 455 U.S. at 559.
75. 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (holding that withdrawable capital shares in a savings and
loan association are securities).
76. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 557.
77. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)) (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 558.
79. Id. at 559. The Acting Solicitor General of the United States submitted a brief to
the Supreme Court as arnicus curiae expressing the combined position of the SEC, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board that certificates of
deposit, if issued by federally regulated banks whose deposits are insured by the FDIC, are
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Likewise, the Court observed that the profit-sharing agree-
ment between the Piccirillos and the Weavers was not the type of
transaction that "comes to mind when the term 'security' is
used" 0 and concluded that the agreement differed in several
respects from other unusual arrangements found to involve securi-
ties.8' Specifically, the Court noted that the agreement was a pri-
vate transaction, negotiated one-on-one, with no prospectus dis-
tributed to potential investors; that the agreement was unique (as
evidenced by the provision allowing the Weavers to use the barn
and pasture), lacked "equivalent value" to other investors, and was
not designed to be traded publicly; and that the Weavers' "veto"
power over future loans gave them a measure of control over the
business. 82 Therefore, although the Court did not apply the Howey
test expressly, it held that the agreement was not a security de-
spite the profit-sharing provision. 3
Weaver is troubling for several reasons. First, by relying on
the "context" clause to hold that application of the antifraud pro-
visions is unnecessary if the transaction is governed by another
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, the Court arguably dis-
regarded the legislative history of the Acts as well as its own previ-
ous interpretation of that clause. Second, the Court's failure to ap-
ply the Howey test in a meaningful way casts doubt on whether
that test remains a viable mechanism for determining the presence
of a "security." The Court's ambiguous analysis in Weaver cer-
tainly raises several issues that merit careful consideration. More-
over, the Court's insupportable presumptions about congressional
intent threaten to undermine the objectives underlying the federal
securities laws.8 '
not "securities" for purposes of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) [hereinafter Brief for United
States]. See Kronstein, The CD Muddle, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 395, 396 (1982).
80. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559.
81. Id. at 559-60. The Court contrasted this arrangement with that in SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), which involved 42 purchasers, and SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which offers were sent to more than 1000 potential
investors.
82. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559-60.
83. Id. In a footnote, however, the Court limited its holding: "It does not follow that a
certificate of deposit for a business agreement between transacting parties invariably falls
outside the definition of a 'security' as defined by federal statutes." Id. at 560, n.11,
84. See generally M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SE-
CURITIEs LAW PERSPECTIVE (1983).
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III. "CONTEXT" ANALYSIS AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
A. The "Context" Clause
In holding that it is "unnecessary" to subject federally regu-
lated issuers of certificates of deposit to the Acts' antifraud provi-
sions, the Weaver Court appears to have assumed that the "con-
text" clause authorizes judicial exclusions on the basis of factual
circumstances, even if an instrument otherwise falls within the
statutory definition of "security."8 This assumption continues to
have the Court's support, as evidenced by its more recent decisions
rejecting the sale of business doctrine."6 As an appellate court has
pointed out, however, the "context" clause provides no such
authority.87 Contrary to the Court's implication, 8 the phrase "un-
less the context otherwise requires" does not modify the term "se-
curity" in particular, but precedes a long list of general definitions
in both the 193389 and 193490 Acts. -Moreover, nothing in the Acts'
legislative history suggests that this language refers to the context
of the underlying factual transaction. Rather, early drafts of the
proposed legislation show that the prefatory language refers to the
context in which the defined terms appear in the statute itself, and
the reports accompanying the final version contain no indication to
the contrary.9'
85. The Court offered no authority, legislative or judicial, for this proposition. More-
over, although the Court attempted to distinguish between certificates of deposit and other
forms of debt obligations that fall literally within the statutory definition of "security," the
only differences the Court was able to discern related to the existence of banking regulations
and the relative security of a purchaser's investment, not to the nature of the instruments
themselves. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 557-58.
86. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) ("[T]he context of
the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind of
context to which the Acts normally apply."); see also Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704
(1985).
87. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 331 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
88. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 556 ("The broad statutory definition is preceded. . . by
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context
otherwise requires ....' "); id. at 558-59 ("The definition of 'security' in the 1934 Act pro-
vides that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be
considered a security if the context otherwise requires."); accord Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686-
89.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)-(15) (1982).
90. See id. § 78c(a)(1)-(40).
91. See O'Halloran, 737 F.2d at 330-32. Section 2 of the Senate-enacted version of the
1933 Act employed the phrase "unless the text otherwise indicates." S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra, note 19, Item 5, at 27. An
early House version contained the identical phrase. H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
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Thus, the statutory definitions properly control, regardless of
the factual circumstances surrounding a claim, except when the
language, structure, or legislative history of the Acts (or other fed-
eral legislation) warrants a different meaning."2 The Weaver
Court's conclusion to the contrary is inconsistent with the Court's
understanding of the "context" clause adopted over a decade ear-
lier in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.e3 In National Securities
the Court observed: "Congress itself has cautioned that the same
words may take on a different coloration in different sections of
the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their
lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context oth-
erwise requires.' ""
Although Chief Justice Burger cited International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Daniel in Weaver to support the Court's
"factual" application of the "context" clause, 5 Daniel rested on
several independent grounds.96 Furthermore, the Daniel Court did
This phrase was later replaced by the words "unless the context otherwise requires." H.R.
5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra, Item 9,
at 99. Although the later House version ultimately was adopted, the House Conference
Committee Report on the bill that was to become the Securities Act of 1933 does not sug-
gest any difference in meaning between 'the two versions. See H. CONF. REP. No. 152, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURiTiES LAWS, supra, Item 17, at 275.
Were a different meaning intended in the final version, it is unlikely that the intended dif-
ference would have gone unmentioned in the Conference Committee Report, as the Report
addresses a number of significant differences between the House and the Senate bills. See
generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 21, at 1698, 1705; 4 L. Loss, supra note 21, at 2485 (Supp.
1969); Hammett, Any Promissiory Note: The Obscene Security-A Search for the Non-
Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 25, 38-40 (1975); Hannan & Thomas, The
Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
219, 277-79 (1974); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of the Business" Doc-
trine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637, 669-70 (1982); Sonnenschein,
Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1567. 1577-78 & n.44 (1980); Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD. L. REv. 233 (1976).
92. See O'Holloran, 737 F.2d at 331. The Third Circuit viewed Weaver as consistent
with its approach: "Although the [Weaver] Court relied in part on the context clause, its
holding was independently supported by the legislative history and structure of the banking
laws and securities acts." Id. at 332 n.29. This contention may be plausible, but little ques-
tion exists that the Court assumes that the "context" clause refers at least in part to the
context of the underlying factual transaction. The latter view is further evidenced by the
Court's decisions rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine. See supra notes 85-91 and ac-
companying text; infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
93. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
94. Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
95. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558 n.7.
96. In Daniel Justice Powell applied the Howey standard and found that the pension
fund failed both the "investment" and the "expectation of profits" aspects of that test. See
supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. By contrast, in Weaver the Court neither applied
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not invoke the "context" clause, but merely offered the existence
of alternative regulatory devices and Congress' belief that it was
filling a "regulatory void" when it enacted ERISA9 7 as additional
support for the Court's conclusion that the transaction in question
was not a security. Indeed, although it garners heightened signifi-
cance in retrospect, 98 Justice Powell's dicta in Daniel appears to
have been little more than an afterthought in response to any lin-
gering doubts that the added protection of the antifraud provisions
was necessary.19
By contrast, the Court based its reasoning in Weaver largely,
if not solely, on the availability of the "context" clause as a means
to exclude certain instruments from the definition of "security." 100
The language in Weaver, particularly when considered with the
subsequent decision in Landreth, indicates that the Court appar-
ently adheres now to the view that the "context" clause refers (at
least in part) to the underlying transaction's factual context. 10 1
Nevertheless, with respect to the Court's certificate of deposit
analysis, an argument can be made that although the Court looked
at the transaction's factual surroundings, its rationale was pre-
mised principally on the structure and legislative history of the
federal banking and securities laws.1 02
If the foregoing construction represents the Court's view in
the Howey test nor offered any other rationale for excluding the transaction. The Weaver
Court instead relied on its observations that the existence of comprehensive banking regula-
tion, together with the availability of insurance by the FDIC, made application of the secur-
ities laws unnecessary. See 455 U.S. at 558-59. Although the latter observation might sug-
gest that the Court applied a sort of risk capital analysis in addition to its "context" clause
analysis, the Court's disposition of the accompanying profit-sharing agreement is at best
inconsistent with a risk capital approach. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. In
short, while the Court may have hinted at the application of a risk capital analysis in its
treatment of the Weavers' certificate of deposit, little in Weaver suggests that the Court has
overcome the reluctance it displayed in Forman, see Forman, 421 U.S. at 857 n.24, to em-
brace the validity of that approach.
97. 439 U.S. at 570.
98. See, e.g., Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691-92 (1985); see also supra note 96.
99. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell stated: "If any further evidence were needed
.. the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the matter to rest." 439 U.S. at 569 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). The Daniel Court did not suggest that the existence of ERISA,
by itself, was sufficient grounds to exclude the compulsory noncontributory pension fund
from the definition of "security." Rather, the Court merely noted that the enactment of
ERISA "severely undercut" arguments that extension of the securities laws would serve a
useful purpose. Id. at 569-70.
100. See supra note 96.
101. See 455 U.S. at 556, 560 n.11; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686-87; supra note
86.
102. See supra note 92. But see Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686-89; supra note 86.
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Weaver, then the approach espoused in National Securities'03 has
not been altered markedly. Although the National Securities
Court evidently construed the "context" clause to authorize an
examination confined to the language, structure, and legislative
history of the federal securities statutes, "context" clause analysis
in this setting should not be limited to the Acts. Rather, given the
interrelationship between the securities laws and other federal
statutes, such as those involving antitrust and banking, a court
properly may consider Congress' intended impact on the scope of
the federal securities laws when it enacted the related legisla-
tion. e1 0 In this regard, however, courts should be wary of sweeping
too broadly when applying the "context" clause to exclude instru-
ments from the Acts' coverage. As will be elaborated below, 10 5 even
assuming that Weaver focused on the proper meaning of the "con-
text" language, the Court's application of this concept appears to
have been erroneous. 106
The Court's implicit application of the "context" clause to
preclude the Weaver profit-sharing agreement from constituting a
security also is problematic. 0 7 Although Weaver may be viewed as
holding simply that the Howey test was not satisfied because of,
for example, the failure to establish the existence of a common
enterprises08 the Court's seeming reliance on the "context" clause
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
104. Such congressional intent may be evidenced, for example, by the legislative his-
tory of the related legislation. In this regard, however, Congress did not intend the securities
laws' application to be conditioned on the absence of other regulation. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) ("The rights and remedies provided by
this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or equity .... ).
105. See infra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
106. Moreover, the Court's analysis raises semantic as well as logical problems. Merely
because the Court perceived application of the securities laws to be "unnecessary" in this
particular context, the conclusion does not follow that the surrounding factual circum-
stances "required" exclusion of this transaction. At most, under the Court's rationale, appli-
cation of the securities laws would have been superfluous.
107. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11, where the Court stated:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between transact-
ing parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as defined by the fed-
eral statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the
content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the
factual setting as a whole.
Id. (emphasis added). Relying upon this language, the SEC has taken the position that the
marketing of money market fund shares, the assets of which are comprised of certificates of
deposit, is within the scope of the securities laws. See Brief for United States, supra note
79, at 20-24.
108. This view assumes that the Court impliedly held that horizontal and not vertical
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apparently forecloses this assertion.
Arguably, however, the Weaver Court's "context" analysis in
the investment contract setting0 9 supplements or modifies, rather
than substitutes for, the Howey test. Although this view appears
correct, 10 offering its "context" analysis as a modification of the
investment contract test seemingly would have required the Court,
for purposes of analytical consistency, to recognize the "risk capi-
tal" approach"' as a viable meahs for defining the term "security."
This path was expressly rejected by the Court in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman"2 and, if followed in Weaver, should
have mandated a contrary disposition of the profit-sharing agree-
ment, for the concept of "risk" is at the heart of the Court's "con-
text" analysis."'
If the Weaver Court indeed construed the "context" clause as
a preliminary supplement to the Howey test, the unsettling conclu-
sion must follow that an instrument or transaction can qualify as
an "investment contract" yet not be treated as a security, even
though the instrument or transaction does not fall within an
express statutory exception. This result would not only require a
commonality is necessary to satisfy the common enterprise element of the Howey test. See
infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
109. The same analysis applies if the Weavers' agreement is viewed as a "certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement." See 455 U.S. at 559-60.
110. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
111. The risk capital test remains a viable alternative to the Howey test for ascertain-
ing the presence of an investment contract. Although the federal courts do not generally use
the risk capital analysis, a number of states follow it pursuant to statute or case law. See,
e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2 (a)(16) (1982); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 451.801() (West
Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(20)(West Supp. 1987). For example, in Commis-
sioner of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971), the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that, under the risk capital test, an investment contract exists
whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representa-
tions which gave rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the opera-
tion of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109, relying on Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is
There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367, 377 (1967); see also M. STmiN-
BERG, supra note 15, at 53-55; Carney & Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's Struggle
with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73 (1981).
112. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
113. See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
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court to ignore forty years of judicial gloss, including the Supreme
Court's own observation that the Howey test embodies the "essen-
tial attributes" of an investment contract, 114 but also would permit
the indefinite language of the prefatory clause to govern the
express terms of the statutory definition." 5
Another set of problems arising from the Court's analysis in
Weaver concerns the specific application of the "context" clause.
Assuming that use of the "context" clause to exclude certain trans-
actions from the definition of "security" is a valid exercise of judi-
cial discretion, what guidelines should courts follow? How compre-
hensive must an alternative regulatory scheme be to serve as the
basis for an exclusion?" 6 The Weaver Court concluded that the
combined banking regulation and FDIC insurance backdrop was
sufficient in that case, even though the alternative regulatory
schemes did not provide depositors with a right of action in the
federal courts.117 By relying on the Daniel dicta, however, the
Court may have implied that a regulatory scheme entitling the
government to take action against an issuer would be adequate,
without regard to whether individual investors are afforded any
protection.118 This conclusion is tenable only if one focuses solely
on the Acts' regulatory aspects and disregards their remedial
scope.
Furthermore, by injecting the indefinite "context" analysis
into the definition of "security," the Court has created potentially
serious notice problems. Although certain presumptions about no-
tice are necessary whenever broad statutory definitions are in-
volved, 19 the severe consequences associated with violation of the
securities laws can be rationalized only on the basis of forewarning,
114. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
691 (1985).
115. See infra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
116. See Brockton Say. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D.
Mass. 1983). In holding that a Penn Square CD purchased by the plaintiff through a money
market broker was not a security, the court examined the effect of federal insurance on the
security determination. The plaintiff argued that Weaver excludes certificates of deposit
from federal securities regulation only to the extent that the certificates actually are feder-
ally insured. The Brockton court rejected this argument and stated that the language in
Weaver regarding the protection given to depositors by federal insurance referred only to
the fact that depositors in FDIC banks always have been paid in full and was not meant to
expand the definition of "security." Id. at 1285.
117. See 455 U.S. at 558; see also Arnold, supra note 15, at 461; Bunch, supra note 15,
at 1030-31.
118. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 776 (1979).
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especially in view of the Acts' strict liability and criminal penalty
provisions. 110 Therefore, issuers who reasonably rely on the exis-
tence of other regulatory schemes should not be held accountable
for failure to comply with the Acts' requirements in the absence of
sufficiently clear guidelines on what conditions preempt applica-
tion of the securities laws. Conversely, fraud victims should not be
put in the position of possibly forgoing other remedies or engaging
in costly and ultimately fruitless litigation because the Court has
clouded the issue of what constitutes a security.12'
A related question concerns the role of state and foreign law in
"context" analysis. What, if any, impact should the existence of
parallel state or foreign regulation have in determining the scope
of the federal securities laws? If parallel regulation exists in only
some states, the Weaver analysis raises the possibility that the def-
inition of "security" under federal law may vary from state to
state.'22 Moreover, if the definition can vary by state, it likewise is
possible that conflicting applications of federal law could result
within a single federal appellate jurisdiction. This situation would
lead to inconsistency, uncertainty, and nonuniformity, a conse-
quence at variance with the Acts' objectives.12 3 This result is possi-
120. The seller's failure to perfect an exemption may result in a violation of the regis-
tration provisions of § 5 of the Securities Act, thereby entitling the purchaser to rescind the
transaction against the seller pursuant to § 12(1) of that Act, irrespective of the seller's
culpability. Moreover, "willful" violation of the 1933 and 1934 Acts or the rules and regula-
tions promulgated under the Acts subjects the violator to criminal liability. See Securities
Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982); Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1982). See generally M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT §§ 6:02-6:13 (1985).
121. Under certain circumstances, the state securities statutes and common law can be
invoked successfully by aggrieved parties. See generally Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Re-
sponses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201 (1977); Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Mon-
itoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981); Shaneyfelt, The
Personal Liability Maze of Corporate Directors and Officers, 58 NEB. L. REV. 692 (1979);
Comment, Maryland Statutory and Common Law Remedies for Misrepresentation in Se-
curities Transactions, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 574 (1984).
122. Pursuant to the federal courts' application of different standards in defining a
"security," an instrument may be a "security" under federal law in some circuits but not in
others. The current split in the circuits as to whether vertical as well as horizontal common-
ality satisfies the common enterprise element of the Howey test serves as one example. See
Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for a writ of certiorari); infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text. Of course, in the
states' construction of their respective blue sky laws, the definition of "security" may vary
from state to state. See generally Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to
the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).
123. Moreover, as Exchange Act § 28 provides: "The rights and remedies provided by
this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
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ble, however, because although both Weaver and Daniel specifi-
cally refer to the existence of other federal regulatory schemes and
contain no mention of overlapping state (or foreign) regulation, the
Court's "context" analysis is essentially a functional approach.
Yet another troublesome ramification of the Court's "context"
analysis in Weaver is the possibility that the definitional scope of
"security" periodically may assume different proportions, depend-
ing upon the regulatory context at the moment it is invoked. For
example, if banking regulation had been nonexistent when the
Weaver case arose, the Court by its own analysis would have con-
cluded that a security was present. If an identical claim arose
shortly after the institution of extensive banking regulation, how-
ever, the result necessarily would be different. Conversely, the re-
peal of regulation could give rise to situations in which transac-
tions formerly not constituting securities would be deemed to fall
within the Acts' scope. Thus, the Court's "context" analysis could
engender divergent modes of treatment within the identical species
of transaction, albeit at different times. Perhaps the Daniel Court
obliquely anticipated this ground for objection by noting, "Con-
gress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted
ERISA.' ' 124 The Weaver analysis, however, suggests that in the
absence of clear legislative intent, the definition of "security" could
expand and contract with the ebb and flow of future legislation,
regardless of what Congress may believe when it acts. 2 '
Although a skeptic might assert that the foregoing objections
are too speculative, these considerations, when examined both
individually and in their totality, reinforce the conclusion that the
Court's current "context" analysis is an inappropriate method of
defining a security. Moreover, it is difficult to fathom that Con-
gress intended the "context" clause to operate in this manner. If
developments subsequent to the securities laws' enactment have
made their application onerous or unnecessary in certain situa-
tions, the reasonable remedy is the one reflected in the Acts them-
selves: specific legislative exclusion, not judicial activism, is the
law or equity . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
This potential problem also is present under the Goldberg line of cases, Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978), when a federal
court looks in part to the applicable state law for ascertaining the existence of federal rights
and liabilities under the securities laws. For further discussion on this subject, see Ferrara &
Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L.
REv. 263 (1980).
124. 439 U.S. at 570.
125. See 455 U.S. at 558.
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appropriate solution.
B. The CD Morass and its Ramifications
On the surface, the Weaver Court's decision regarding the cer-
tificate of deposit, supported by an amicus curiae brief of the Act-
ing Solicitor General of the United States expressing the combined
1126view of four government agencies, is correct. Unfortunately, the
Court and the government applied a superficial regulatory function
analysis without scrutinizing the significant policy issues at stake.
Succinctly stated, the existence of banking regulations-no matter
how extensive-will not eliminate fraud in the industry (including
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities), though the regulations
do serve as a deterrent. The Weavers' disheartening predicament
alone is sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. Similarly,
although the availability of depositor insurance goes a long way to-
ward providing peace of mind in ordinary banking transactions, it
does not necessarily guarantee against fraud. Moreover, because
the banking regulations theiiselves do not create a private right of
action,127 they are an ineffective substitute for the antifraud pro-
tections of the federal securities laws. 28
The Supreme Court's holding to the contrary confuses the
problem of overregulation with the nature of the remedy Congress
sought to provide. The Acts have at least a dual function: to pro-
vide an adequate and accurate informational flow to the investing
public and to ensure a measure of integrity and protection against
abuse in the marketplace. 29 These functions are performed largely
through the Acts' registration, reporting, and "antifraud" require-
ments and through the creation of governmental as well as private
rights of action against misleading and deceptive conduct.10
Although these requirements and rights of action serve to reduce
126. See Brief for United States, supra note 79.
127. See Arnold, supra note 15, at 461; Bunch, supra note 15, at 1030-31, 1034-35.
128. It is clear that § 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, pro-
vides an implied right of action for damages. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.04
(1986).
129. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (asserting that the goals of the
Securities Acts are to promote investor protection, integrity of the marketplace, and high
ethical standards in the securities industry); Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163 (1979); supra note 19.
130. See, e.g., Securities Act § 5 (requiring registration of offerings); Exchange Act §§
12-13 (requiring registration of and periodic reporting by certain publicly held companies);
Exchange Act § 10(b) (containing a broad antifraud provision and impliedly providing for a
private right of action for damages).
512 [Vol. 40:489
DEFINITION OF SECURITY
the risk of fraud, Congress recognized that certain instruments or
transactions, because of the contexts in which they take place or
the nature of the "security" itself, are less likely to be vehicles for
abuse. Therefore, Congress exempted these less "risky" instru-
ments or transactions from the Securities Act's registration
requirements and subjected them only to modified informational
guidelines.13 1 On the other hand, because some possibility of abuse
exists irrespective of the instrument's or transaction's nature, Con-
gress did not exempt any security from the antifraud provisions.132
Thus, the likelihood of abuse is relevant only to the issues of
registration and reporting, not to whether the antifraud provisions
should apply. Fraudulent misconduct in the context of any securi-
ties transaction will give rise to civil or criminal liability, or
both. 13  Furthermore-and most important for purposes of this
discussion-the likelihood of abuse should play no part in deter-
mining what is, and what is not, a security. Although the context
in which a particular transaction occurs may exempt it from cer-
tain of the Acts' requirements, that context does not alter the
nature of the instrument itself. Phrased differently, if an instru-
ment or transaction meets the Acts' definition of "security," it al-
ways will remain a security, regardless of whether the registration
or reporting requirements apply.
The Weaver Court thus appears to have confused Congress'
rationale for exempting certain instruments or transactions from
registration and reporting requirements with the securities laws'
antifraud thrust. If the Court declines to recognize this incon-
gruity, its present construction of the "context" clause may lead to
situations in which an instrument or transaction, although falling
within the definition of "security," nevertheless will not be treated
as a security. This consequence would lead, in turn, to the very
result the Court has sought to avoid: commercial confusion and un-
131. See, e.g., Securities Act § 3(a)(2) (exempting securities issued or guaranteed by
the United States from the registration requirement of § 5); Id. § 4(2) (providing a transac-
tional exemption from § 5 for private offerings). For the type of information that must be
disclosed pursuant to a § 4(2) private placement, see Rule 506 of SEC Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.503, 230.506 (1986).
132. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985) ("[A]lthough §
4(2) of the 1933 Act... exempts transactions not involving any public offering from the
Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
provisions.").
133. This assertion assumes, of course, that the complainant establishes the require-
ments for a private right of action, for example, by being a purchaser or seller with the
resulting standing to sue under Exchange Act § 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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certainty both in business planning and in investment
transactions. 34
Upon scrutiny, the Weaver Court's analysis appears to have
developed as follows:
(1) The Court observed that federally regulated banks are gov-
erned by extensive reserve, reporting, inspection, and advertising
requirements-devices that serve a purpose analogous to the
Securities Act's registration and information requirements. There-
fore, the Court employed a line of reasoning similar to the one that
led Congress to exempt certain instruments or transactions from
the registration (and, in some cases, the reporting) requirements of
the securities laws: because the transaction's context indicated lit-
tle risk of abuse, the Court looked to the risk of loss to determine
whether the Acts' antifraud provisions should apply to the certifi-
cate of deposit.
(2) Upon examining the risk of loss, the Court concluded that
because the FDIC insures certificates of deposit issued by federally
regulated banks, there was no need to invoke the antifraud
provisions.
(3) The Court apparently combined the two lines of analysis:
even though the certificate of deposit in Weaver fit the definition
of a security, because, first, the banking regulations substantially
duplicated the securities laws' registration and reporting functions
and, second, the FDIC protected depositors, both functions of the
securities laws were served, a result that obviated the need to place
a certificate of deposit within the Acts' scope.
(4) Accordingly, the Court found no need to consider the cer-
tificate of deposit a "security."
There are several flaws in this logic. First, when a security is
involved, need and context are irrelevant to the application of the
antifraud provisions. The Acts' remedies address actual instances
of abuse in the investment markets, whether private or public, not
merely abuses that occur in those contexts in which fraud is most
likely. Therefore, although the registration and reporting require-
ments may not apply to certain instruments and transactions, to
limit the antifraud remedy is contrary to a fundamental premise
underlying the Acts.13 5 Moreover, FDIC protection is not analogous
134. For examples of the Court's decisions rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine,
see Gould, 471 U.S. at 704-06 (1985); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696 ("[U]ncertainties attending
the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the best interests of either party to a
transaction.").
135. Although the Court has limited the antifraud remedy of § 10(b) of the Exchange
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to the availability of a private right of action under the securities
laws: the former insures against loss, but the latter serves as both a
deterrent and a remedy in proper circumstances. 13 6
The Weaver Court mistakenly assumed that the only "risk"
confronting depositors is the possibility of bank failures1 5 -- a con-
text in which FDIC insurance indeed has fulfilled its purpose.
Weaver's facts, however, demonstrate that the possibility of fraud
on certificate of deposit holders is not so sharply circumscribed.
Undoubtedly, although other types of instruments or transactions
may be involved, endless variations on the Weaver scenario are
possible. By focusing on the context of one particular transaction,
rather than on the nature of the transaction itself, the Court erro-
neously equated the question of what constitutes a security with
the frequency with which a specific pattern of fraudulent conduct
can be expected to occur. That the Court inverted the proper
inquiry is evident from its conclusion, which it phrased in terms of
the propriety of subjecting certain issuers to liability, rather than
of the need to provide actual securities fraud victims with a
remedy."' 8
The shortcomings of this approach-in which the presence of
government regulation serves to displace private rights of action
under the federal securities laws-have become evident in other
contexts. For example, in the wake of Daniel and Weaver, a num-
ber of courts have held that interests in voluntary, contributory
pension plans are not securities.39 To support their holdings, these
Act by requiring scienter, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), this limita-
tion does not undermine the purpose of the Acts. Requiring scienter clarifies the definition
of "manipulative or deceptive" conduct that falls within the scope of the antifraud provi-
sions, but does not limit the availability of the remedy in the presence of prohibited
conduct.
136. By focusing on the availability of FDIC protection and the existence of extensive
banking regulation, the Weaver Court also disregarded the need for protection at both ends
of a securities transaction, as the Third Circuit observed. See Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637
F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1980). Merely because one party to a particular type of transaction is
in an unlikely position to be the victim of fraud should not influence the scope of the an-
tifraud provisions if the transaction otherwise involves a "security."
137. See 455 U.S. at 558.
138. Id. at 559 ("It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to
liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of
bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.").
139. See, e.g., Conrad v. Colgate-Polmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); Polack v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
867 (1979); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 94 (D. Haw. 1982); Newkirk v. General
Elec. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,216 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
Tanuggi v. Grolier, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,880, at 95,609
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courts cite the thorough regulation of such plans under ERISA and
the source of their appeal to participants, which derives from their
"insurance-like stability... and not the prospect of growth." 140 On
the other hand, the SEC, in a position taken prior to Weaver, has
asserted that these plans are securities. The Commission's ration-
ale is that (1) a voluntary contributory plan constitutes an
employee's investment of identifiable consideration in return for a
separable financial interest; (2) some of these plans maintain for
each participant a separate account that defines the participant's
contributions; and (3) "[b]y deciding to participate in the plan vol-
untarily, the employee implicitly has made an investment decision
to the effect that his contribution will achieve investment results
that will be equal to or superior to those he could obtain from
investing his funds elsewhere."' In the current deregulatory cli-
mate the SEC, perhaps not surprisingly, has not invoked this posi-
tion actively post-Weaver. Unlike holders of certificates of deposit
issued by federally regulated banks that are insured by the FDIC,
however, the participant in a voluntary, contributory pension plan
incurs both the risk of the plan's insolvency and the lack of busi-
ness acumen on the part of the plan's investment advisers.142
The problems devolving from Weaver's "functional" approach
are also evident in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' post-
Weaver decision Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico. s14 In Wolf the
court faced the issue whether time deposits in Mexican pesos is-
sued by a Mexican bank to a United States citizen were securities
within the meaning of the Acts. Relying on Weaver's rationale, the
Ninth Circuit examined the components of the Mexican banking
system and found that Mexican bank regulation was comparable to
regulation in the United States. Hence, the court held that "when
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); supra note 48.
140. Tanuggi v. Grolier, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,880, at
95,609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
141. Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6281, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 1052 (Jan. 15, 1981); Employee Benefit Plans, Interpretations of Statute, Securities
Act Release No. 6188, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1051 (Feb. 1, 1980).
142. ERISA §§ 404-410, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1110 (1982). Although ERISA proscribes
certain classes of transactions for plan fiduciaries, sets forth "prudence" requirements for
such fiduciaries, and provides for personal liability upon breach of "any of the responsibili-
ties, obligations or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1109(a))]," nev-
ertheless, "[a] 'prudent' fiduciary has wide discretion under ERISA in how he invests the
plan assets." Raymond, ERISA Trusts and Tender Offers, 13 S-c. REG. L.J. 253, 262 (1985),
citing Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp.
816, 819 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
143. 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
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a [domestic or foreign] bank is sufficiently well regulated that
there is virtually no risk that insolvency will prevent it from repay-
ing the holder of one of its certificates of deposit in full, the certifi-
cate is not a security for purposes of the federal securities laws. '144
Under Wolf's application of Weaver, it appears that whenever
a foreign country has extensive banking regulations virtually guar-
anteeing depositors repayment, certificates of deposit issued by
banks chartered in that country are not securities under United
States law. This extension of Weaver, although evidently consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's functional analysis, appears unwar-
ranted, particularly with respect to the absence of antifraud pro-
tection. Under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, foreign banks,
which are not subject to banking regulation under United States
law, can publicly market their certificates of deposit in this coun-
try, yet evade coverage of the Acts.
Congress could not have intended this result, and, irrespective
of Wolf, foreign banks that engage in public marketing of their
deposits likely do so at their peril.145 Although not eliminating the
drawbacks of Weaver and its progeny, the SEC's approach would
be to ascertain the commercial or investment nature of the foreign
certificates of deposit.1 46 Factors to examine under this approach
would include the manner of issuance (particularly the presence of
underwriting or promotional activity), the certificates' length of
maturity, the extent and nature of the issuance (including the
number of certificates issued, the number of depositors who pur-
chased the certificates, and the "sophistication" of the purchasers),
and the manner in which the issuer or its promoters characterized
144. Id. at 1463. The lower court in Wolf came to a different conclusion, reasoning:
In this case it is not contested that Mexico thoroughly regulates its banks and that no
Mexican bank has become insolvent in fifty years. That is not enough, however, to
make Wolf's investment virtually free of risk. Indeed, governmental regulation has no
effect on the essential risk to which an investor in foreign time deposits is ex-
posed-the risk of devaluation. Because the rationale of Weaver is inapplicable here,
the Court holds that plaintiff's time deposits were securities.
Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (footnote omit-
ted), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985). See also
Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (CD issued by bank chartered in the
Grand Cayman Islands may be a security).
145. See Farrar, Foreign CD Deemed Outside Securities Law, Legal Times, Oct. 29,
1984, at 15.
146. For decisions applying the "commercial/investment" test to ascertain whether a
note transaction is a "security," see, e.g., Bauerer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770
(D.C. Cir. 1981); American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635
F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1980); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d
1108 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the certificates. 47 The SEC's approach implicitly recognizes the
deficiency of Weaver without coming to terms with it: many of the
above factors look to the "risk" of loss to the purchaser, even
though pursuant to regulation in those foreign countries, deposi-
tors are "virtually guaranteed" repayment in full. 148 Under a num-
ber of circumstances, as in Weaver, a depositor's risk of loss may
not be limited to a foreign bank's insolvency. The SEC alludes to
this "risk," yet abandons its concern for investor protection if the
certificates are deemed, under the foregoing factors, to be "com-
mercial" in nature.149
IV. INVESTMENT CONTRACT ANALYSIS
A. The Meaning of "Investment Contract"
Prior to Weaver, courts generally were consistent in applying
the Howey test to determine the presence of an investment con-
tract. Although the basic test has been refined in response to previ-
ously unaddressed factual situations, the fundamental considera-
tions remained unchanged: was there (1) an investment, (2) in a
common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits derived
essentially from the efforts of others? 50 Weaver, however, is so rid-
dled with ambiguities that its analysis-or lack thereof-does not
make clear how courts should apply the test in the future. Al-
though post-Weaver decisions have continued to apply the Howey
test,' ' Weaver casts doubt on whether the Howey test is applica-
ble in all cases of investment contract analysis. Indeed, the distinct
possibility exists that Weaver retains the Howey test as the basic
standard, but in substantially revised form.
The Third Circuit's decision in Weaver concerning the profit-
147. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 17, Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 739
F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Brief for SEC].
148. See Wolf, 739 F.2d at 1463-64. The SEC's approach, impliedly focusing on the
degree of "risk," resembles somewhat the Ninth Circuit's "risk capital" test for determining
whether a note transaction is a "security." See, e.g., Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
149. See Brief for SEC, supra note 147, at 17-18. Applying the above factors, the SEC
opined, after receiving advice from federal banking regulators, that most certificates of de-
posit issued by foreign banks are "commercial [representing] short term cash management
or the placement of funds awaiting use for payment or similar transactions." Id.
150. See supra notes 26-55 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,368 (10th Cir. 1985); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730
F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th Cir.
1983).
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sharing agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos rested
squarely on the Court's construction of "investment contract" or,
alternatively, "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-
sharing agreement.' 1 52 Although the Supreme Court's framing of
the issue on appeal suggested an analysis of the transaction in the
same terms, in reality the Court seems to have avoided applying
the Howey test as it had evolved through prior judicial interpreta-
tion. Instead, the Court noted initially that the profit-sharing
agreement was not among "those instruments ordinarily and com-
monly considered to be securities.' 15 3 This observation, however,
appears to exclude the arrangement from only one of the Acts' def-
initional categories-"any instrument commonly known as a 'se-
curity.' ",s5 As the Court indicated in Tcherepnin v. Knight, a
more sweeping conclusion would be the product of "misplaced
emphasis"'155 because the "commonly known" language does not
act as "a limitation on the other descriptive terms used in the stat-
utory definition. 15' Furthermore, when the Weaver Court sought
to distinguish the profit-sharing agreement from other "unusual"
instruments found to constitute securities, it merely listed a series
of factors-in rather haphazard fashion-without explaining how
they relate to Howey-type analysis. 57
The distinguishing features listed by the Weaver Court fall
into a number of categories. " 8 First, the Court observed that the
profit-sharing agreement was private and negotiated "one-on-
one.' 59 In this regard, the Court, at first blush, seems to have held
implicitly that "horizontal" commonality, and not "vertical" com-
monality, is required to satisfy the Howey test's common enter-
prise element. 60 Generally, all courts hold that horizontal com-
monality (which looks to the relationship between an individual
investor and the pool of other investors) meets this element of the
Howey test.' Courts widely disagree, however, on whether vertical
152. See Weaver, 637 F.2d at 161-62; supra note 68.
153. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559.
154. See supra note 17; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
155. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 343 (1967).
156. Id., citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).
157. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559-60.
158. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
159. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559-60.
160. See id. at 560 n.10, citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1260-62
(9th Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., concurring) ("[an] unsecured note, the terms of which were ne-
gotiated face to face, given to a bank in return for a business loan, is not a security").
161. See, e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d
Cir. 1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S
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commonality is sufficient.162 Vertical commonality generally
requires only that the investor(s) and promoter (or third party) be
involved in some common venture. 163 Based on Weaver, some
lower courts have asserted that the vertical commonality approach
no longer survives."" This view, although plausible, is premature.
Indeed, a number of other courts have ruled otherwise, refusing to
read Weaver in an unduly restrictive manner.' 5 This latter inter-
pretation of Weaver's implications finds strong support in the
Court's post-Weaver denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari
in Mordaunt v. Incomco.16 6 In Mordaunt Justice White, dissenting
from the denial of the petition, surveyed the divergent views
among the lower courts concerning the requisite commonality and
opined that "[i]n light of the clear and significant split in the Cir-
cuits, I would grant certiorari.' 67
Hence, the requisite commonality to satisfy Howey's common
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 224 (6th Cir.), aft'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982): "no horizontal common
enterprise can exist unless there... exists between [the investors] themselves some relation-
ship which ties the fortunes of each investor to the success of the overall venture."
162. For decisions holding that vertical commonality is sufficient, see, e.g., McGill v.
American Land & Exploration Co., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
T 92,368 (10th Cir. 1985); Meyer v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686
F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Booth v. Peavey Co., Commodities Servs., 430
F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970). For courts ruling that vertical commonality is not sufficient for
Howey's common enterprise element, see cases cited supra note 161.
163. This issue often arises in the context of individual discretionary trading accounts.
These accounts clearly are not securities if horizontal commonality is required. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 161. In addition, for a number of courts adopting the vertical com-
monality approach, these accounts are not securities because they create no "direct relation
between the success or failure of the promoter and that of his investors." Mordaunt v. In-
comco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985). Hence, as the
Ninth Circuit stated in Meyer v. Thompson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686
F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982): "Plainly, just as in Mordaunt and Brodt, the promoter continued
to profit through commissions even as the account lost money. On the other hand, had the
account been successful, the promoter would not necessarily have shared the benefits be-
cause [the investor] could elect to withdraw profits as they accrued." Id. at 819 (citations
omitted). See generally Raisler, Adams, & Donley-Hoopes, Discretionary Commodity Ac-
counts: Why They Are Not Governed by the Federal Securities Laws, 42 WAsH. & LEE L.
REv. 743 (1985).
164. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Thoele, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,854 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
165. See, e.g., McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,368 (10th Cir. 1985).
166. 469 U.S. 1115 (1985).
167. Id. at 1117 (White, J., dissenting).
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enterprise element appears to remain an open question. A court
applying the Court's "economic reality" approach should hold the
requisite commonality to exist when the profits derived by the
investor are interwoven substantially with the efforts exerted by
and benefits received by the promoter. Phrased somewhat differ-
ently, there must be "some direct relation between the success or
failure of the promoter and that of [the] investor[s]."' 6 8 The offer-
ing's size and the number of investors should be relevant only to
whether the offering is exempt from registration." 9 The exclusion
of an instrument otherwise deemed an "investment contract" from
the Acts' antifraud provisions merely because the transaction in-
volved a single investor would constitute an assault on the underly-
ing purposes of the Acts. Moreover, the result should not turn on
whether a "prospectus" is distributed. The Weaver Court's impli-
cation in this regard17 0 is the product of hopelessly circular logic: if
a prospectus is required only upon first determining that a security
is involved, how can "security" be defined in terms of whether a
prospectus is distributed?17 '
In short, as the Court concluded in Tcherepnin, whether a
particular instrument is publicly traded is immaterial if it other-
wise fits the definition of "security."17 2 An instrument's suscepti-
bility to public trading may be evidence of its character in com-
merce, but the Court made clear in its very first decision
construing the definition of "security" that the Acts' scope does
not end with the "obvious or commonplace.' 173
Moreover, by dwelling on the "unique" nature of the transac-
tion, as evidenced by both the provision granting the Weavers use
of company property for private purposes and the instrument's
lack of "equivalent value" to other potential investors, the Weaver
Court took an unduly narrow view of the notion of "profits." Not
only could the former provision be viewed as an incidental benefit
168. Mordaunt, 686 F.2d at 817. See supra note 163.
169. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 637 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1986).
170. See 455 U.S. at 560.
171. Under a literal interpretation of Weaver's language, an issuer arguably could es-
cape liability by operating solely through word of mouth. Of course, the Court could not
have intended to suggest this possibility, but thinking it through demonstrates the inade-
quacy of the Court's analysis.
172. 389 U.S. at 343, 345.
173. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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of the overall transaction,174 but also these aspects of the agree-
ment merely indicate that the investment partners in Weaver were
especially well matched-a significant characteristic of potentially
successful ventures. As long as a true capital investment occurs
and the investing party does not meaningfully participate in man-
agement of the enterprise, 17 5 neither "uniqueness" of the arrange-
ment's terms nor the subjective value of profits yielded should
have any bearing on whether a transaction involves a security.
Finally, to preclude a transaction from constituting a security
because the investor obtains a measure of "control" over the enter-
prise is contrary to established authority. As long as "the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably signifi-
cant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the fail-
ure or success of the enterprise,"' 76 the "profits to be derived from
the efforts of others" standard is deemed met. Examined in a
somewhat different light, a "veto" power over further borrowing
until existing obligations are satisfied (as in the Weaver-Piccirillo
agreement) is a bargaining point that may be negotiated with re-
spect to conventional debt securities. Investors and borrowers
agree upon such restrictive covenants in certain situations, particu-
larly those of high risk, because in such circumstances investors,
not surprisingly, are loath to part with their money without some
assurance that it will be handled responsibly.177 In light of the Pic-
cirillos' financial record, a potential investor would have been fool-
ish to enter into the arrangement without insisting on this condi-
tion. Furthermore, nothing indicated that the Weavers intended to
undertake any managerial responsibility for the enterprise. Hence,
in the absence of fraud the veto provision, at most, would have
provided the Weavers some measure of protection for their invest-
ment; any revenues (and consequent profits) generated from the
agreement, however, would have resulted solely from the Picciril-
los' managerial skills.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, none of the distin-
guishing factors relied on by the Weaver Court would have
174. See Weaver, 637 F.2d at 162. The procedural posture of Weaver is relevant to
this observation. Because the case was decided on summary judgment in the absence of
additional factfinding on this point, the determination of whether this benefit was primary
or incidental to the transaction apparently would have been a futile exercise.
175. See supra notes 22-55 and accompanying text.
176. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 82 (1973). See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
177. See W. KLEIN, BusiNuss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 160 (1980).
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excluded the transaction under conventional Howey analysis. As
Chief Justice Warren once explained in a similar context, such fac-
tors "serve only to distinguish among different types of securities.
They do not, standing alone, govern whether a particular instru-
ment is a security under the federal securities laws.' 78 Moreover,
without further enlightenment from the Court, these distinctions,
taken together, failed to provide useful guidelines for applying the
Howey test. As a result, significant uncertainties emerge from
Weaver concerning the future definition of "security."
B. Howey's Continued Vitality
As Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth makes clear, the Court
has not abandoned the Howey test in the investment contract set-
ting.' 79 Moreover, in light of Weaver's facts, any suggestion that
the Court has adopted an alternative "risk capital" approach' s° is
meritless: it is difficult to conceive of a riskier investment proposi-
tion than guaranteeing the debts of a business on the verge of
bankruptcy.
In view of the various extraneous factors that the Weaver
Court found to be pertinent, however, it is unlikely that the con-
ventional Howey test endures as the sole standard for defining an
"investment contract." The Court simply injected too many addi-
tional considerations for the Howey guidelines alone to remain dis-
positive. Unfortunately, the Weaver Court never adequately
explained-or even attempted to explain-how its observations in-
teracted with the Howey test's various components.''
If Weaver represents a modification of or supplement to the
Howey test, which is the only reasonable conclusion under the cir-
cumstances, the Court's analysis has several unsettling implica-
tions. For example, as discussed above,' 82 the Court's observations
about the "uniqueness" of the Weavers' arrangement with the Pic-
178. Tchereprin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 344 (1967).
179. See Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691 (1985), where the Court stated that "the Howey
economic reality test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an 'in-
vestment contract,' not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory
definition of 'security.'" (emphasis in original).
180. That the Weaver Court cited Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976), a leading example of the risk capital test in the "note" context, in
support of the Court's conclusion that Congress "did not intend to provide a broad federal
remedy for all fraud," creates some confusion about what the Court was suggesting. See 455
U.S. at 556.
181. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
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cirillos arguably suggest that the second component of the Howey
test (the "common enterprise" requirement) is satisfied only when
a transaction involves a pool of similar investors. Whether "verti-
cal" commonality (an arrangement involving one investor and at
least one "manager" of a profit-seeking enterprise) is sufficient, or
whether "horizontal" commonality (an arrangement involving
more than one investor, in addition to management) is required,
has been a controversy among the lower courts. 183 Although the
issue calls for expeditious resolution, it would be unfortunate were
the several unilluminating references in Weaver to "private trans-
actions" and "one-on-one" negotiations to signal the end of this
debate, without further elaboration of the opposing viewpoint's
merits. 1 4
Similarly, the Weaver Court's comments about public trading
and negotiability could foster the conclusion that arrangements
such as limited partnerships are beyond the Acts' scope if their
terms are privately negotiated and include restrictions on trans-
fer-as is often the case. Arrangements with these characteristics
generally have been held to involve securities,18 5 and for Weaver to
prompt courts to hold otherwise on these grounds would defy rea-
son. Likewise, an instrument's mere novelty or uniqueness should
bear little relevance to whether a security is involved.,l8 Indeed, as
the Howey Court perceived, the definition of "investment con-
tract" is designed to encompass "a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits.
'18 7
Unfortunately, Weaver sheds too little light on these issues
and generates several concerns that otherwise might not matter,
obscuring both the role and the content of investment contract
analysis. By abstaining from meaningful application of the Howey
183. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
184. In this regard, however, Justice White's dissent from the Court's denial of the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting), signals that this issue still is very much alive. See supra notes 166-67 and ac-
companying text.
185. See, e.g., Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Mur-
phy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Felkay v. ZB Ltd. Partnership No. 1, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
186. See, e.g., Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974) (Scotch Whiskey receipts); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (beaver breeding).
187. 328 U.S. at 299.
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test without sufficient explanation, the Court leaves one with the
uneasy conviction that it has contorted the relevant inquiry in
order to find support for a preconceived conclusion.
Nevertheless, Weaver signifies that an investment contract
may not exist even if the Howey test is satisfied. Although far from
certain, an instrument apparently will not be deemed an invest-
ment contract, irrespective of the Howey test, if (1) the transaction
involves a novel or unique instrument, (2) that is not capable of
mass distribution or public trading, (3) when no prospectus has
been distributed, and (4) the transaction is negotiated privately
and involves few individuals. 188 This interpretation of Weaver,
while consistent with the thrust of the Court's holding, does not
undermine investment contract analysis. In addressing Weaver's
impact in this manner, the proffered interpretation comports with
the Court's view that the securities laws were not designed to pro-
vide a remedy for all fraud.189 At the same time, the Howey test
remains, as it has since its adoption, the principal focus for deter-
mining the existence of an investment contract.
V. THE COURT'S MISGUIDED VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
After acknowledging the broad definition of "security" in the
Securities Exchange Act,18 0 reviewing the expansive interpretation
that definition had undergone in prior case law,191 and noting the
remedial purpose of the federal securities laws, 9 the Court began
its analysis in Weaver by asserting that "Congress, in enacting the
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy
for all fraud."'"" The spirit of this conviction pervades every aspect
of the Weaver opinion: it is the force behind the Court's conclusion
188. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982). Under this interpreta-
tion, Weaver should not be limited to one-on-one transactions. The Court, as seen from
Justice White's dissent from the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari in Mordaunt,
469 U.S. 1115-17, did not intend to address the requisite commonality issue. Moreover, it
appears likely, based on the Court's language, that the Court would have reached the same
result if the transaction had been, for example, a three-on-one transaction, provided that all
the other Weaver circumstances were present.
Importantly, under the profferred interpretation all the conditions must exist for
Weaver to place the transaction outside the federal securities laws' scope. If any condition is
not present, then the proper analysis for determining the existence of an investment con-
tract is solely the Howey test (presuming the inapplicability of the risk capital test).
189. See 455 U.S. at 556.
190. Id. at 555.
191. Id. at 556.
192. Id. at 555-56.
193. Id. at 556.
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that the "context" clause authorizes judicial exclusion of certain
instruments from the Acts' scope, and it apparently stimulated the
Court's efforts to distinguish the Weaver profit-sharing arrange-
ment from other unconventional transactions that constitute
securities. Because the way the Court sought to implement its ob-
servation about congressional intent conflicts with the federal se-
curities laws' underlying purposes, however, the wisdom of the
Court's analysis is questionable.
Undoubtedly, the Court's assertion is correct at its most literal
level: Congress clearly did not intend to remedy all instances of
fraud with a single (or double) legislative wave of the hand, no
matter how sweeping the scope of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. To pur-
sue the contrary position would be to mistake the obvious: despite
the Acts' undeniable breadth, Congress intended to address only
those transactions involving "securities." Moreover, in ascertaining
the coverage of the securities laws, judicious application of tradi-
tional canons of statutory construction may lead one to conclude
that an instrument "may be within the letter of the statute and
not yet within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers."'194
The misguidance of the Weaver Court is more subtle and,
unfortunately, more significant. Viewed in isolation, the Court's
assertion that federal securities legislation is not directed against
all fraud may be interpreted as alluding to the securities laws' re-
medial scope. In fact, however, the Court invoked its observation
about congressional intent to confine even further the antifraud
provisions' coverage, by employing the observation in defining the
term "security" itself. In essence, by concluding that Congress did
not intend the Acts to remedy "all fraud," the Court decided
Weaver under the erroneous assumption that it had discovered a
vehicle for narrowing the federal securities laws' reach.
This assumption ignores the reality that the type of conduct
that the Acts prohibit and the definition of "security" are unre-
lated, except to the extent that a security must be present for the
194. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), cited in
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). Hence, a long-term note
executed by a bank customer in exchange for the financing of a consumer good (for example,
a personal automobile) would be excluded from the securities laws' coverage under this prin-
ciple. For discussion of notes and the applicability of the securities acts, see generally Son-
nenschein, supra note 91. Of course, if the principle is applied too broadly, the same
problems as those seen in the Court's "context" clause analysis will arise. See Thompson,
supra note 50, at 250-52.
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antifraud provisions to apply. Observations about one have no
bearing on conclusions about the other. A finding that fraud has
occurred in a particular factual situation does not in itself qualify
the transaction involved as a security; likewise, the mere presence
of a security will not expose a party to a transaction to liability
under the antifraud provisions absent evidence of prohibited
conduct.
The Weaver Court appears to have presumed that because the
Acts do not extend to all types of fraud, neither must they encom-
pass all types of transactions, even those that otherwise fit the def-
inition of "security." The flaw in this reasoning is its failure to rec-
ognize that although the securities laws do not broadly prohibit all
fraud, the antifraud provisions do prohibit all instances of manipu-
lative or deceptive conduct "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."1 95 Thus, not only do the limits on the anti-
fraud remedy place no corresponding restrictions on the definition
of "security," the antifraud provisions make clear that prohibited
conduct in the context of any transaction meeting the definition of
"security" falls within the Acts' scope.
Of course, the Weaver Court was not speaking literally when it
indulged in its reading of congressional intent. On the surface, the
Court's point apparently was merely that the securities laws are
not a panacea for claims of fraud in all types of business transac-
tions. The Court, however, seems to have misdirected this principle
by focusing on the nature of the fraud and the existence of alterna-
tive remedies as being determinative of whether a security is pre-
sent. In particular, the Court's comments about the profit-sharing
agreement's uniqueness and private nature, together with its
observations about FDIC protection and banking regulation, sug-
gest a de minimus approach to determining the scope of federal
securities regulation. 198
Nor should it escape notice that Weaver is devoid of any per-
suasive support for how the Court interpreted congressional
"intent" in construing and then constraining the definition of "se-
curity.' 7 That any sort of de minimus approach is foreign to the
195. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982) (emphasis added); cf. Securities Act§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982) (the corresponding antifraud provision of the 1933 Act).
196. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 557-60. The final paragraph of the Weaver decision fos-
ters this impression by implying that the appropriate remedy resided in the pendent state
claims. See id. at 560-61.
197. The Court offered no support from the legislative history for its interpretation
and cited only two lower court cases, neither of which addresses the congressional intent
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Acts' operation underscores this deficiency. For example, the strict
liability consequences for noncompliance with the Securities Act's
precise and extensive registration requirements make clear that
Congress was adopting a stern approach when it designed this leg-
islation.19 Even those transactions purportedly falling within the
limited offering and private offering exemptions are scrutinized to
determine whether they meet the exacting guidelines, and all these
transactions are subject to the antifraud provisions. 199 One of the
few aspects (perhaps the only aspect) of the securities laws even
faintly suggesting a de minimus approach is the materiality
requirement of the Acts' remedial provisions,20 0 but even that con-
cept has nothing to do with whether the transaction itself consti-
tutes a security. Rather, "materiality" measures the importance of
misinformation (or omission of information) to investors and the
marketplace, and although the standard is not subjective,01 its em-
phasis is on the misconduct's significance to the parties allegedly
aggrieved-not to the overall scheme of regulation.
The Weaver Court's understanding and application of con-
gressional "intent" threaten to restrict the scope of the federal
securities laws to large-scale, multi-investor transactions and to
those transactions occurring in the ordinary investment markets.
While recognizing that instruments having the attributes of tradi-
tional stock are necessarily "securities," the Court's decisions
rejecting the sale of business doctrine 20 2 do not diminish the possi-
issue in any significant way. See 455 U.S. at 556 (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), and Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir.
1974)). In Kotz the Ninth Circuit applied a "risk capital" approach in analyzing a promis-
sory note given to a bank in the course of a commercial financing transaction. In Bellah the
Fifth Circuit analyzed a note issued in a loan transaction and commented simply that it had
"grave doubts" that registration of commercial paper under the securities laws was a result
sought by Congress.
198. See Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982), which grants the purchaser the
right to rescind the transaction against the seller of a security when the security was offered
or sold in violation of § 5 of that Act. Id. § 77e.
199. See, e.g., Securities Act §§ 3(b), 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(2); SEC v. Murphy,
626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran v.
Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of the
applicability of the antifraud provisions, see supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Securities Act §§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771; Exchange Act §§ 14(e),
18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 78r(a).
201. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omit-
ted fact is material [under Rule 14a-9] if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.").
202. See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 703-04 (1985); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985); supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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bility of a narrowing scope in other contexts. When the instrument
involved is more irregular, and the inquiry therefore focuses on
whether an investment contract exists, Weaver's implications may
signify that individual investors in small-scale or family-run enter-
prises will be denied protection under federal law. ' This is possi-
ble because the thrust of the Court's logic in its recent decisions,0 4
other than those involving the sale of business doctrine, generally
is to reserve application of the securities laws to protect the "busi-
ness" of investment.
Hence, by asserting that the Acts were not intended to remedy
"all fraud," the Court implied that the antifraud provisions nor-
mally apply only to those transactions that fit a common, familiar
mold, or-as the Weaver Court revealingly put it-"those instru-
ments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securities in the
commercial world. 20 5 This reasoning not only confuses the "eco-
nomic reality" approach to defining "security" with the frequency
and visibility with which certain types of transactions occur, but it
also neglects the underlying purposes of the Acts, which make no
such distinctions in their design "to protect the investing public
and honest business. 2 0
VI. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SUPREME COURT INADEQUACY IN
SECURITIES LAW CONSTRUCTION
Marine Bank v. Weaver is an example of judicial activism at
its worst. Little doubt exists that the type of fraudulent miscon-
duct alleged in Weaver would have satisfied the antifraud provi-
sions' "manipulative or deceptive" standard, were either of the
203. In this regard, the Landreth Court asserted that scrutiny of the transaction's eco-
nomic substance need be conducted only when the instruments involved were "unusual...
not easily characterized as 'securities.'" 471 U.S. at 690.
204. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975).
205. 455 U.S. at 559. An argument supporting the Court's rationale may be set forth as
follows:
[I]f it be recognized that the danger of fraud is quantitatively and qualitatively re-
duced where a transaction is both isolated and private, there is persuasive force in the
argument that the application of the special fraud procedures, protections and reme-
dies of the securities laws should be cut off short of the thousands of transactions
which involve only a handful of knowledgeable or sophisticated buyers.
Coffey, supra note 111, at 411. Upon analysis, however, it appears that "factors in mitiga-
tion of the probability of fraud are relevant to the issue of exemption [from registra-
tion]-not to the issue of security status." Id. at 408.
206. See supra note 19.
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transactions in question found to involve a "security." Therefore,
to find a basis for excluding each of those transactions from the
Acts' scope, the Weaver Court strained to narrow the definition of
"security." In doing so, the Court either ignored or displaced fairly
well-established guidelines by drawing distinctions where few sig-
nificant differences existed and devised ill-conceived theories for
limiting the Acts' reach.
To subordinate individual claims to the demands of a defined
regulatory scheme is one thing; indeed, effective statutory con-
struction requires the segregation of pertinent claims from those
that are equally distressing but that arise in extraneous contexts.
To employ questionable methods to recast legislative directives so
that the latter coincide with one's private conception of how legal
affairs should be ordered is quite another matter. Whatever the
Court's rationale for departing from its earlier philosophy of
broadly applying the securities laws to prevent abuse in the private
or public capital-raising markets-whether a fear of the antifraud
provisions' expansion into a blanket remedy for all commercial
misconduct, a desire to curtail the federal courts' burgeoning
caseload, or simply a recognition of the regulatory environment's
increased complexity since the securities laws' enact-
ment-Weaver's effect is to superimpose a layer of uncertainty on
the meaning of "security" and to raise troubling questions about
the Acts' scope.
In all fairness, although Weaver represents a personal catas-
trophe for the plaintiffs, it is reasonable to assume that the subtler
implications of Weaver were overlooked in the deluge of seemingly
more pressing issues the Court faces each term. Moreover, in view
of the Acting Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief urging rever-
sal,207 the relatively simple fact pattern, the evident availability of
state law remedies, 208 and, at least superficially, the opinion's
apparently limited scope, it is understandable (although indeed
unfortunate) that a unanimous Court joined Chief Justice Burger's
opinion. Nevertheless, the Court's analysis contains severe defi-
ciencies: Weaver is wrought with misreading of statutory com-
mands, distortion of relevant definitions, and misleading sugges-
tions about congressional intent.
Were Weaver an isolated, self-contained instance of short-
sightedness in the press of more urgent matters, the shortcomings
207. See Brief for United States, supra note 79.
208. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 554, 561; Weaver, 637 F.2d at 159, 165.
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inherent in the Court's analysis might be explained. As detailed
above, however, Weaver's ramifications are especially far reaching.
Moreover, in deciding other important issues in recent terms, the
Court has demonstrated a similar lack of sophistication in its
approach to federal securities regulation. Two major subjects of
national concern further illustrate this deficiency: tender offers209
and insider trading.21 0
A. Tender Offer Regulation
During the past decade, the proliferation of hostile multimil-
lion and billion dollar takeover bids for corporate control has gen-
erated much debate over the propriety of defensive and offensive
maneuvers by corporate management.' The implementation of
these maneuvers, including "golden parachutes," "shark repellant"
provisions, "lock-ups," "poison pills," "scorched earth" tactics,
"white knights," and the "Pac-Man" defense, 1 2 has prompted
aggrieved parties to seek judicial redress. Under state law, for the
most part, the business judgment rule has shielded management
from liability.2 1 3 As a result, plaintiffs have focused their attention
209. Generally, a "tender offer" is an offer to shareholders of a company (often made
without the approval of that company's management) to exchange their stock for securities
and/or cash at a specified price or for other specified consideration.
210. Generally, "insider trading" refers to the act of trading or tipping on the basis of
material, nonpublic information. Hence, the term encompasses "outsiders" as well as
"insiders."
211. See, e.g., K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS: CORPORATE AMERICA'S BILLION-DOLLAR
TAKEOVERS (1985); TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES (M. Steinberg ed.
1985); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028
(1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corpora-
tions: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981);
Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
COLuM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
212. Definitions of these maneuvers are provided in M. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at
743-45; Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recom-
mended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225, 237 app. (1984).
213. The business judgment rule allows corporate fiduciaries who engineer the various
tactics to escape liability for the ensuing consequences. Generally, the rule creates, in the
absence of self-dealing or other conflict of interest, "a [rebuttable] presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See, e.g., Treadway Cos., Inc., v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 550 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (business judgment rule may not be in-
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on the scope of section 14(e) of the Exchange Act,214 the basic fed-
eral antifraud provision regulating tender offers. The fundamental
issue is whether section 14(e) is directed solely at ensuring ade-
quate disclosure or whether the statute also is intended to reach
the legitimacy of bidders' maneuvers to procure corporate control
and target managements' maneuvers to fend off hostile bidders.
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Schreiber v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc. 21 5 Prior to Schreiber, although a clear
majority of lower courts held that section 14(e) was directed to dis-
closure only, 21 a minority of courts211 and numerous commenta-
tors"" argued that tactics which artificially inhibited the operation
of a fair market for the corporation's stock and thus precluded
shareholders from tendering to their favored bidder were "manipu-
lative" within the meaning of section 14(e), even if those tactics
were fully disclosed.2 9 In asserting this position, many authorities
relied not only on policy reasons, but also on the framework, statu-
tory language, and legislative history underlying section 14(e) to
conclude that the statute has a dual purpose: "first, to provide
shareholders the required information; and second, to [prevent]
any conduct that unduly impedes the shareholders' exercise of the
decision-making prerogative guaranteed to them by Congress.
'220
In Schreiber a unanimous Court held that section 14(e) is con-
cerned only with the sufficiency of disclosure, 2 which signifies
voked to justify grant of lock-up in an active bidding situation).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting any material misrepresentation or nondis-
closure or "any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with
any tender offer or ... any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation").
215. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
216. See, e.g., Feldman v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052
(1984); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
217. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
218. See, e.g., Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1171 (1984); Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Wil-
liams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L. J. 1311 (1983); Lynch & Steinberg,
The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979);
Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against
Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
219. See authorities cited supra notes 217-18.
220. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). See supra
authorities cited notes 217-18.
221. 472 U.S. at 8. The Court concluded that "all three species of misconduct [listed
in Section 14(e)], i.e., 'fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative' . .. are directed at failures to
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that the legitimacy of takeover tactics is a matter solely within the
purview of state law. Although the Court's conclusion is supporta-
ble, its reasoning is inadequate. The Court failed to acknowledge
the existence of a contrary view based upon a different reading of
the statute's language and legislative history. Pointing to its deci-
sion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green22 that section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act does not reach breaches of fiduciary duty absent
misrepresentation or nondisclosure,223 the Schreiber Court opined
that Congress intended section 14(e), like section 10(b), to be
solely a disclosure statute. The purpose of section 14(e), the Court
asserted, is to provide shareholders with information adequate to
enable them to make informed decisions on whether to tender
their stock.224 Unfortunately, the Court failed to address, even
minutely, how shareholders can make informed choices if "show-
stopper" and similar takeover tactics,225 which Schreiber now per-
mits under federal law, are undertaken by the respective bidding
and target managements for the very purpose of precluding share-
holders from tendering to their favored bidder. Phrased differ-
ently, nowhere did the Court confront the inconsistency in its
logic: Disclosure matters little to informed shareholder decision-
making when takeover tactics effectively prevent any meaningful
disclose." Id.
222. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
223. Id. at 474. For further discussion, see Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 123.
224. The Court reasoned:
Congress' consistent emphasis on disclosure persuades us that it intended takeover
contests to be addressed to shareholders. In pursuit of this goal, Congress, consistent
with the core mechanism of the Securities Exchange Act, created sweeping disclosure
requirements and narrow substantive safeguards. The same Congress that placed such
emphasis on shareholder choice would not at the same time have required judges to
oversee tender offers for substantive fairness.
Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 12. The Court, however, declined to address the assertion aptly put
forth by former District Court Judge Sofaer:
A review of the Act's legislative history with the legitimacy of defensive tactics in mind
reveals that Congress indeed meant for the federal courts to prevent tender offer par-
ticipants from interfering with the informed investor choice that the Act sought to
assure. One can safely say that the Act underwent from its original introduction in
1965 to its ultimate passage in 1968 a steady transformation from legislation designed
to prevent corporate takeovers by cash tenders, to a bill that studiously maintained
neutrality between offerors and targets, but consciously protected the rights of share-
holders to transfer managerial power by tendering their shares, with proper informa-
tion and without undue interference.
Data Probe, 568 F. Supp. at 1545.
225. Generally, a "show-stopper" maneuver is any action taken by target management,
such as the sale of the company's "crown jewel" (the most prized asset), that has the effect
of materially impeding or precluding shareholders from tendering their stock to the "hos-
tile" bidder.
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shareholder decision in the first place.
Thus, the Schreiber Court applied a wooden analysis, refusing
to acknowledge contrary legislative history and to examine the dif-
ficult issues. Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on one's
point of view), the Court's decision signifies that the legitimacy of
takeover maneuvers in multibillion dollar tender offers, which have
both national and international ramifications, 26 will be examined
solely under state law. To proponents of corporate accountability
and shareholder democracy, the states' continual "race for the bot-
tom" in matters of corporate law signals that these interests will be
neglected.2 Schreiber also means that Delaware, the predominant
state of incorporation for publicly held companies,228 will have the
principal voice in determining the validity of takeover tactics.2
B. Insider Trading
Like tender offer regulation, insider trading has aroused
national'"0 and worldwide231 concern.23 2 The deluge of SEC en-
226. See generally K. DAVIDSON, supra note 211; Mergers and Takeovers, J. of Comm.,
Apr. 4, 1986, at 15A, col. 1 (reporting that in 1985 the value of mergers totalled $180 billion,
that there were 268 acquisitions valued at $100 million or more, and that there were 36
billion dollar transactions).
227. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 123, at 267-72; Comment, Law for
Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
Delaware's recent passage of legislation resulting in greater protection for corporate fiducia-
ries in duty of care situations provides yet another example of that state's willingness to
accommodate the interests of management. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7) &
145(b), (e), (f), (j) (Supp. 1986); 18 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1309 (1986). See
generally Special Project, Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L. REV. 599 (1987). But
see Fischel, The "Race for the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
228. See, e.g., Friend, Chancery Court-High Stakes in Delaware, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 13,
1984, at 1 ("[A]bout half of the nation's 500 largest corporations are incorporated in [Dela-
ware] because of its liberal corporation law . . . ").
229. Recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions support this statement. See, e.g., Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (invalidating
"lock-up" and "no shop" clauses given to competing bidder when company was to be broken
up); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding board of directors'
adoption of a "poison pill"); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(upholding use of issuer tender offer and excluding the hostile potential bidder under busi-
ness judgment rule); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984) (applying business judgment
rule in the tender offer setting). On this point, see Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A Proposal
for a National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 303 (1986).
Professor Fiflis opines: "One may properly ask whether it is appropriate for Delaware, which
conceivably may not be the abode of a single Unocal shareholder, to fix national policy in an
international securities market, while Congress and the federal courts, Nero-like, abdicate a
policymaking role." Id. at 306.
230. See, e.g., Dentzer, Greed on Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1986, at 44-46;
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forcement actions, 233 as well as the widespread public perception
that insider trading is common in the securities markets,3 4 is evi-
dence of this concern. When Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934
Acts, one way it sought to remedy this problem was by including
the "short-swing" trading prohibition of section 16(b) of the Ex-
change Act 23s and the antifraud provisions of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.2 6 To effec-
authorities cited infra note 234.
231. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock, and Call Options for the
Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND CORPORATION LAW: REPORT
FROM A SYMPOSIUM IN SWEDEN (C. Roos ed. 1984); Carvalhosa & Eizirik, Disclosure and In-
sider Trading Regulation: Recent Developments in Brazilian Law, 4 J. CoMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 395 (1982).
232. Some authorities assert, however, that permitting insider trading has social value.
See, eg., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983). These commentators argue:
"The unique advantage of insider trading is that it allows a manager to alter his compensa-
tion package in light of new knowledge, thereby. . . increas[ing] the manager's incentive to
acquire and develop valuable information in the first place (as well as to invest in firm-
specific human capital)." Id. at 870-71.
233. For a description of many of these actions, see M. STEINBERG & R FERRARA, supra
note 120, §§ 2:06-2:15. See also Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-
Standards for Their Imposition, Modification, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 27
(1980); authorities cited supra notes 230-31.
234. See Poll Finds Majority Thinks Insider Trading is Common, Wall St. J., June 6,
1986, at 3, col. 4 (reporting that two out of every three American adults in a Wall Street
Journal/NBC News poll perceive that insider trading is common).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Generally:
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act relates to officers, directors, and principal
stockholders of publicly held corporations. It requires them (in paragraph (a)) to file
reports of their ownership of their corporation's equity securities, provides (in para-
graph (b)) for their liability to their corporation for profits made in trading in these
securities within any six-month period, and generally prohibits them (in paragraph (c))
from selling short or delaying delivery of such securities after sale.
Ferber, Short-Swing Transactions Under the Securities Exchange Act, 16 REv. SEC. REG.
801 (1983). See M. STEINBERG, supra note 128, §§ 4.01-4.09.
236. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982); Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982). See also Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (proscribing manipulative acts or
practices). For example, the House Report explained the provision that was to become § 16
of the Exchange Act as follows:
A renewal of investors' confidence in the exchange markets can be effected only by a
clearer recognition upon the part of the corporate managers of companies whose securi-
ties are publicly held of their responsibilities as trustees for their corporations. Men
charged with the administration of other people's money must not use inside informa-
tion for their own advantage. Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of
law between truly inside information and information generally known by the better-
informed investors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of inside information is
full and prompt publicity. For that reason, this bill requires the disclosure of the corpo-
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tuate Congress' intent in the insider trading setting, lower federal
courts adopted the "equal access" theory in construing section
10(b). Succinctly put, the equal access theory commands that those
persons who regularly receive or are "tipped" material nonpublic
information by such "access" persons and who have reason to
know that the information is derived from a corporate source must
either disclose the information to the marketplace as a whole or
refrain from trading (and tipping).23 1 Hence, under this approach
tippees "stand in the shoes" of their tippers. If the tipper could
not trade on the information, generally neither could the tippee.235
The equal access theory enjoyed widespread, if not universal,
judicial acceptance until the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella
v. United States.3 9 In Chiarella, over stinging dissents,4 0 the
Court rejected the equal access theory, opting instead for a ration-
ale based upon state law notions of fiduciary duty.2 1' The duty to
disclose, the Court asserted, rested upon a fiduciary or similar rela-
tionship between the parties to the transaction. 42 In the context of
tippee trading, as the Court subsequently held in Dirks v. SEC,2 43
tippees are precluded from trading only if the tipper breached a
fiduciary duty and the tippee knew or should have known of the
breach. Moreover, by conditioning this breach of duty upon the
tipper's intent to benefit financially from selective disclosure, the
Dirks Court engrafted a motivational requirement onto the law of
rate holdings of officers and directors and stockholders owning more that 5 [enacted as
101 percent of any class of stock, and prompt disclosure of any changes that occur in
their corporate holdings. Short selling and selling against the box by insiders are pro-
hibited ....
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1934). For further discussion, see Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Rem-
edies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982).
237. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
238. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v.
Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). This principle's well-established foundation
prompted the authors of one textbook to state that the "prohibition [against trading on
material, nonpublic information] almost certainly extends to the immediate 'tippees' of the
insiders who, by trading on such information, participate in the wrong committed in the
giving of the tip." L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, & D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POL-
iCy 908 (1982).
239. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
240. See id. at 245-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
241. Id. at 232-35.
242. Id.
243. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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tipper-tippee trading. 44
Both Chiarella and Dirks left open the possibility that one
who misappropriates confidential information may be liable under
section 10(b). 24 Under the misappropriation theory, certain per-
sons, such as investment bankers, attorneys, and financial printers,
who trade on or tip information given to them in confidence have
breached a duty owed to their employer and to their employer's
clients. 24" Although a number of decisions have applied this the-
ory,247 little question remains that Chiarella and Dirks have con-
fused insider trading law to the detriment of the investing public
and marketplace integrity.
Today, as a result of Chiarella and Dirks, th government,
self-regulatory organizations, private parties, and the courts all
must look to concepts of fiduciary duty, financial benefit, and mis-
appropriation to determine the legality of transactions undertaken
or contemplated.248 The equal access theory, in the context of sec-
tion 10(b), is dead.249 Not surprisingly, in neither Chiarella nor
244. Id. at 660. The Court also stated that a "gift" conveyance would satisfy its "in-
tent to benefit" test. In that situation "[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient." Id. at 664. In addition, the Court,
in a footnote, developed the quasi-insider theory: "Under certain circumstances, such as
where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer,
or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders." Id. at 655 n.14. For discussion of Chiarella, Dirks, and their implications, see,
e.g., A. BROMBERO & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 7.4-7.5
(1985); Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Aproach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and Insider
Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause and Effect, 43
MD. L. REV. 292 (1984); Karjala, Statutory Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal
Markets, 1982 DUKE L.J. 627; Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A
Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982); Wang, Trading on Material Non-
public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
245. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37. More recently, the
Court made an apparently favorable reference to the misappropriation theory in Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985), quoting Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 665 (stating that "a tippee may be liable if he.. . 'misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s]
the information' ").
246. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). In many situations involving insider trading by accountants,
attorneys, investment bankers, and others retained by the corporation, the quasi-insider
theory also may be employed to impose liability. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14; supra note
244.
247. See cases cited supra note 246; authorites cited supra note 244.
248. Other concepts receiving Supreme Court approval in the insider trading context
include the "gift" and "quasi-insider" theories. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14, 664; supra
notes 244 & 246.
249. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656-59; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-35. Reacting to
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Dirks did the Court offer any specific legislative history to support
its reasoning. Moreover, reliance on state law based principles of
fiduciary duty is misplaced. Congress clearly intended the federal
securities laws to offer greater protection than state law
provides.25 °
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green2 51 the Court ruled that
section 10(b), absent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, does not
encompass misconduct involving breach of fiduciary duty.252 Yet,
illogically, the Court in Chiarella and Dirks looked to state law
concepts of fiduciary duty to determine the existence of federal
disclosure obligations under that very same statute. In sum,
Chiarella and Dirks exhibit a lack of both understanding and
sophistication regarding the federal framework underlying insider
trading law.2 53 Unfortunately, these decisions, while difficult to
Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986), pursuant to its
rulemaking authority under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act. The rule's significance is that it
revitalizes the equal access theory in the tender offer context. In short, Rule 14e-3, with
certain exemptions, invokes the disclose-or-abstain provision when an individual possesses
material information relating to a tender offer and has reason to know that the information
is nonpublic and was procured (directly or indirectly) from a corporate source. For commen-
tary on Rule 14e-3, see, e.g., Gruenbaum, The New Disclose or Abstain from Trading Rule:
Has the SEC Gone Too Far?, 5 CORP. L. REV. 350 (1981); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3
and Dirks: "Fairness" Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Koprucki, Market
Insiders' Duty Under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Rule 14e-3 to Disclose Material, Non-
public Market Information, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 558 (1981); Loewenstein, supra note 218;
Note, Trading on Material, Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 539 (1981).
250. In his dissent in Chiarella, Justice Blackmun noted:
By its narrow construction of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Court places the federal
securities laws in the rearguard of this movement, a position opposite to the expecta-
tions of Congress at the time the securities laws were enacted. I cannot agree that the
statute and Rule are so limited. The Court has observed that the securities laws were
not intended to replicate the law of fiduciary relations. Rather, their purpose is to en-
sure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets where
common-law protections have proved inadequate. As Congress itself has recognized, it
is integral to this purpose "to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue
preferences or advantages among investors."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
251. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
252. See 430 U.S. at 474; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
253. With respect to Chiarella, Professor Anderson is far more critical. She asserts:
"This is not a Supreme Court construing a complicated federal statutory scheme with wis-
dom, craft, and candor; this is a first-year Torts class on a bad day." Anderson, Fraud,
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HoFsTRA L. REV. 341, 376-77 (1982). Referring to
Weaver, another respected authority has opined: "The Court's rationale for its holding, if an
answer to a law examination including the identical question, would probably have been
graded F by 95% of the securities regulation professors in the United States." H. BLOOMEN-
THAL, 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK xlvii (1982).
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fathom from a purely analytical standpoint, also have an adverse
impact at a very practical level. During a period when public per-
ception of insider trading abuse is at a highpoint,254 the Court's
position has increased the difficulties that both aggrieved parties
and the government face in initiating successful litigation against
this practice. 55
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the Supreme Court's approaches to
tender offer regulation and insider trading seeks to illustrate that
Marine Bank v. Weaver, while very significant by itself, is also
part of a disturbing trend. Whether or not the results reached in
these particular cases are correct, the Court's reasoning, analysis,
and methodology have been disconcerting. One hopes that the
Court will recognize and correct these deficiencies. In this regard,
the Landreth Court's observation concerning the weakness of its
own case law256 is a positive sign. Until the Supreme Court takes
corrective steps, however, its decisions affecting securities regula-
tion may continue to misconstrue congressional intent, look away
from compelling arguments developed among the lower federal
courts, and confuse, rather than clarify, the law.
254. See Poll, supra note 234 (observing, moreover, that "[t]he recent spate of insider
trading cases has increased concern on Wall Street that the stock market's reputation might
suffer").
255. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Switzer,
590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
256. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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